As Jones and Silberzahn documented in the 2013 volume Constructing Cassandra: Reframing Intelligence Failure at the CIA
As Jones and Silberzahn documented in the 2013 volume Constructing Cassandra: Reframing Intelligence Failure at the CIA, 1947–2001, while hypotheses are essential to sorting "signals" from "noise" in raw intelligence data, the variety, types and boundaries of the types of hypotheses an intelligence organization entertains are a function of the collective culture and identity of the intelligence producer. Often, these hypotheses are shaped not merely by the cognitive biases of individual analysts, but by complex social mechanism both inside and outside that analytic unit. After many strategic surprises, "Cassandras" – analysts or outsiders who offered warnings, but whose hypotheses were ignored or sidelined – are discovered. Therefore, careful analysts should recognize the key role that their own and their organization's identity and culture play in accepting or rejecting hypotheses at each step in their analysis. Jones, Milo L. and; Silberzahn, Philippe (2013). Constructing Cassandra, Reframing Intelligence Failure at the CIA, 1947-2001. Stanford University Press.